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By Yianna Danidou and
Burkhard Schafer
TRUSTED
COMPUTING AND
THE DIGITAL
CRIME SCENE
ARTICLE:
This paper analyses the future of digital
forensics in an environment where control is
increasingly taken away from PC users and
remotely managed by trusted third parties,
typically to improve internet security. Trusted
Computing (TC) is used as the most developed
example to illustrate some of the possible legal
issues that arise.
Introduction 
Consider the following physical world crime scene
scenarios:
1. The house of a suspect in a murder inquiry is
searched. In a locked room, and a locked chest
within that room, a bloodied knife is found that
has the DNA of a murder victim on its blade. The
room and the chest were securely locked, the
owner of the house being the only one with a key
that he never left out of his sight. There is no sign
that either lock was tampered with, or that
anyone other than the owner has ever been in 
the room.
2. As above, but this time there are clear signs that
someone had at least tried to force both locks,
and there are some signs that someone other
than the owner had been in the room and
interfered with some of the furniture.
3. As in 1 above, but this time, the owner had given a
key to the room, but not the chest, to a cleaning
agency. They had entered the room several times,
but there is no reason to believe they had interest
in the chest, or the ability to open it. 
4. As in 3, but this time, the owner has given copies
to both the room and the chest to a security
company that patrolled the house regularly and
checked all rooms and storage facilities for
intruders or explosive devices. The company had
outsourced several of its activities to other
partner companies, making copies of the key
available to them as needed. Their records
confirm without doubt that nobody but the owner
and employees or agents of the company entered
the room between the time of the murder and the
police search that seized the knife.
What can we say in these four scenarios about the
evidential value of the knife? Intuitively, it seems clear
that the owner of the house in scenario 1 has some
explaining to do. Objects found in his possession can
be clearly attributed to him, and there is no obvious
explanation for the knife other than that he hid it
there. Equally, it seems intuitively clear that the
situation is considerably different in scenario 2.
Someone other than the owner probably had access
to the room and the chest, and not only that, the
methods used to gain entry indicate the third party
had criminal intentions. In scenarios 3 and 4, the
situation is much less clear. In 3, much will depend on
the details of the case: the trustworthiness of the
employees of the cleaning company, their
effectiveness in vetting employees, the degree of
supervision of employees while they were in the
room, and the number of people that could have
entered the room. Where someone had the ability to
enter the room, the difficulty of opening the chest
becomes a factor. Even if the senior managers or
directors of the organization did not have any reason
to frame the owner, the position of the employees
must also be considered. In scenario 4, the situation
is even more complex. On the one hand, the type of
manipulation encountered in scenario 2 can be ruled
out with much more confidence. This also affects
scenario 1, or rather our justification to believe that
the specific situation at the heart of an investigation
falls into that category. It rules out the possibility that
a burglar may have opened the chest (scenario 2), but
was so good at his job that he did not leave any
traces behind, making it look like scenario 1. On the
other hand, a very high degree of trust is now placed
with the security company and its employees. While in
2, the owner and unknown third parties may have
placed the knife in the chest, in 4 there are is a finite
number of suspects, the owner and the people he
employed for his security.
Why this matters for a journal on digital evidence.
To understand this, we have to transfer our scenarios
into the virtual realm, where the house becomes a PC,
the room an individual program running on the PC,
and the chest contains the equivalence of individual
files created by that program. Scenario 1 now
exemplifies how lawyers, and arguably also the
police, have often naively thought about the “crime
scene computer”. In this view of the world, the owner
(or password holder) is the only one with access to its
content, and if illegal material is found on such a
device, there is at the very least a strong assumption
that it is there with the owner’s knowledge and
consent. In England, aspects of this view have found
their way into the law in the form of an evidential
presumption: computers, as a mechanical instrument,
are presumed to be in order. This assumes, amongst
other things, that programs are not corrupted by third
parties.1 For many reasons, this picture was always at
best an overly simplistic version of reality that relied
on numerous highly problematic assumptions, such
as how many people are physically located within
range of the computer that might have been able to
use it if they wanted to; whether it really was
protected by passwords; whether the computer was
set up to ensure a password had to be put in each
time the computer ‘went to sleep’; whether the wi fi
was on or not, and if it was on, whether the security
provisions were sufficient enough to prevent a third
party from entering the computer from outside.
It is this last aspect, the inability of a third party
entering from the outside, that concerns us in this
paper. The problems with this specific assumption
came to the forefront of the attention of the law when
facts similar to scenario 2 were the subject of
prosecutions or civil actions. Scenario 2 is broadly the
equivalent to the Trojan defence as used in the cases
of Matt Bandy,2 Aaron Caffrey and several others.3
Caffrey was acquitted by a jury of the charge of
unauthorised computer modifications, which were
part of a DoS attack against the Port of Houston’s
computer system in September 2001. Caffrey
successfully argued that the evidence against him
was planted on his machine by the real attackers, and
that his computer had been ‘zombified’ by an
unspecified Trojan that gave the attackers control of
his PC. Even though a forensic examination of
Caffrey’s PC found attack tools (our ‘bloody knife’), it
did not find any traces of a Trojan infection (our
‘scratch marks on the lock’). Nonetheless, the jury
accepted the defence argument that a Trojan could
wipe itself – blurring the line between our scenario 1
and 2 above. To the extend that Caffrey’s argument
was convincing, we could never be certain if we are
really dealing with an unproblematic scenario 1, or a
problematic scenario 2.
Matt Bandy, a minor himself, was prosecuted for the
possession of child pornography. Facing a possible
sentence of imprisonment of up to 90 years, the
ability of his defence team to show that his
computer’s protection had been disabled and that his
computer had at the time been infected by more than
200 viruses and other malware, including Trojans that
could have allowed third party access to his computer,
allowed him to enter a plea bargain that resulted in an
18 month suspended sentence. His case illustrates
two points that will be relevant later: first, the
tendency by users to disable protective software (for
instance to ‘free up’ CPU) or to fail to update it is an
enabling factor for cybercrime. Second, at least
according to the defence team, the police was overly
naïve in assuming a ‘scenario 1’ type setting, without
testing the necessary assumptions with sufficient
rigour.
Malicious outsiders are, however, not the only
problem that demonstrates the problematic
assumptions underlying scenario 1. Almost every
computer user will have granted – knowingly or
unknowingly – at one time or another an automated
update agent in the computer the right to obtain
access to the internet and to download updates. In
this respect, we are almost always in a ‘scenario 3’
type setting, where the digital equivalent of
1 For a critical discussion of this presumption and
the often unrealistic assumptions it is based on,
see Stephen Mason, general editor, Electronic
Evidence (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010)
chapter 5
2 For an analysis of the Bandy investigation see
Stephen Mason, editor, International Electronic
Evidence (British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 2008), pp. lxxv-lxxxiii.
3 Susan W. Brenner, Brian Carrier and Jef Henninger,
‘The Trojan Horse Defense in Cyber crime Cases’,
21 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law
Journal, 1 (2004-2005) pp. 3-50. Links to several
unreported uses of the Trojan defense can be
found here: http://www.forensicswiki.org/
wiki/Legal_issues
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‘domestics’ carry out largely unseen work on our
computers all the time. While it is unlikely that
anyone working for an anti-virus vendor would hold a
grudge against a particular person, and could
circumvent the internal auditing and security
measures to use that permission to install an illegal
program or file on their computer, it is equally true
that at any given point in time, a large number of
organizations can legitimately make changes on the
owner’s computer system.
It is however scenario 4 that is at the centre of this
paper. As with its off-line counterpart, it allows us to
rule out with a high degree of confidence evidence
planted by malicious third parties as described in
scenario 2. On the other hand, every crime scene now
becomes potentially tainted should the trust in the
third party and its employees be misplaced. Trusted
computing can be seen as such a security service, and
to understand why it is nonetheless seen as an
appealing model by many, we have to discuss in more
detail the regulatory and risk assessment
environment that gave rise to the TC initiative.
Unsophisticated users have long been identified as
the weakest link in any strategy to make the internet
more secure against cyber attacks. It is their
computers that provide the raw material for botnets,
the main tool for denial of service attacks, when they
forget or fail to update their system with patches, let
their anti-virus software expire or forget to update the
virus signatures.4 Once sufficiently large, these
botnets in turn can also threaten the systems of more
resourceful and sophisticated users, including servers
that are crucial for the very functioning of the
internet.5 An apparently obvious solution from the
point of view of the technicians is to remove the
responsibility of providing security for the computer
from the general user, and assign it to a third party.
This in turn creates several legal issues for the
employees of these third parties, and several of them
are discussed in more detail below. For instance, it is
necessary to consider if exclusionary rules against
illegal searches by the police are applicable by
analogy, or if a third party employee finds
incriminating material by accident, what the liability is
if he chooses not to report it. For obvious reasons,
any third party entering into a contract to perform
such a service will need certain rights to obtain
access to a computer or system to perform the
contract effectively. As noted above, whether or not
this is acceptable becomes a question of trust – there
is nobody a king or president has to trust more than
his bodyguards, because they tend to be the only
people allowed to carry weapons in her presence –
but as history illustrates, such trust can be misplaced.
However, if the future of internet security includes a
shift of responsibility (and control) away from
ordinary users to professional organizations, a
number of issues need to be considered, such as:
1. The conditions by which it can be considered to
be rational to trust the security providers.
2. When and if potential interference with the digital
crime scene might become an issue.
3. How the criminal law and the law of evidence
should respond to such a shift in responsibility,
especially if it is the private sector, as opposed to
the state, that takes on the role of securing (parts
of ) the internet infrastructure.
4. Whether it is necessary to adjust laws that were
written mainly at a time when policing was the
epitome of sovereign authority.
To explore some of the possible legal issues that arise
by this strategy, the concept of the Trusted Computing
initiative is considered in this paper as a case study.
The first part will discuss the regulatory and political
environment that gave rise to the initiative, then the
4 Stephen E. Henderson and Matthew E. Yarbrough,
‘Frontiers of Law: The Internet and Cyberspace:
Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of Care in
Cyberspace’, 32 (Winter 2002) New Mexico Law
Review, 11; Ulrich Bayer, Imam Habibi, Davide
Balzarotti, Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel, ‘A
view on current malware behavior’, LEET’09: 2nd
USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and
Emergent Threats, 21 April 2009, Boston, MA, USA,
available at http://www.eurecom.fr/people/
vs_bayer.en.htm; it should be noted at this point
that these solutions are themselves far from
sufficient to provide perfect security – for a
discussion, see e.g. Daniel Bilar, ‘Known knowns,
known unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti-
virus issues, malicious software and internet
attacks for non-technical audiences’, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 6
(2009), pp 123-131. However, the experience with
available security measures shows that no
technological solution, however sophisticated, can
be expected to work if it relies ultimately on active
user involvement and allow the override of
automated protection mechanisms by the owner
of the computer.
5 While state agencies that should know better have
found themselves victims of hacking attacks, the
damage in these cases was typically restricted to
the computer system in question. With botnets, on
the other hand, the victim is not just the user who
lets his computer become infected, but also third
parties and ultimately, the very functioning of the
internet can become threatened. It is this third
party effect that changes the legal and practical
landscape, and goes some way in explaining why
the solution to sustainable internet security is
seen mainly in addressing the large number of
relatively unsophisticated users. From a legal
perspective, it is this involvement of parties other
than the immediate victim that we think creates
unique legal challenges.
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article will briefly explain the technical aspects of this
specific project, before canvassing the possible legal
issues. Trusted Computing serves to illustrate that the
analysis discussed in this paper is not mere speculation,
but it should be kept in mind that the main interest is in
the type of response to cyber crime.
Whom to trust with internet security 
In recent years, politicians have begun to take cyber
crime more seriously. For instance, the UK
government recognizes the detrimental effect that a
cyber attack could have on the economy and the
social well being of the country.6 In 2011, cyber crime
remained the one field of policing that not only
survived the recent spending cuts, but benefited from
substantial additional investment as a result of
reports that estimate the loss due to cyber crime for
the UK at £27 billions.7 The threat of cyber attack is
now classified as a “tier one risk”, next to
international terrorism using chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists, a military
crisis or an influenza pandemic.8
An influential House of Lords report9 in 2007
described the shortcomings of present approaches to
internet security, and critically discussed in great
clarity and detail the regulatory alternatives that
governments are facing and their respective
shortcomings: shift the risks and responsibilities even
further to users (for instance, by leaving the user with
any losses incurred because their computer is not
sufficiently secured, or creating a strong evidential
presumption that they were negligent if their data is
stolen); make it a state priority to provide
considerable new investment in the IT infrastructure,
or to provide incentives to the private sector to
provide software programs that are more secure, by
imposing more, and more easily enforceable, liability
on the software vendor for writing programs that are
vulnerable to attacks.
The internet was not originally intended as a
platform where people spend a substantive
percentage of their lives, engage in commercial
activity on a large scale, or work, play and socialize,
and to interact in various forms with their
governments. As the internet becomes more central to
the lives of some people, it is inevitable that criminals
will exploit its weaknesses to a much greater extent
than previously. At one brief point in time, the main
threat seemed to come from overenthusiastic
teenagers designing viruses, but the risks are now
from highly organized criminal groups with significant
resources, both in terms of expertise and computing
power.10 In addition, entire nation states can be
subject to successful cyber attacks, possibly with the
tacit approval or open participation of foreign states,
or at the very least “rough agencies” close to state
security agencies or the military.11 With hindsight, the
development of the internet might usefully have
included security as a design feature. Starting again
from the beginning is not a feasible option, which
means that any response is likely to be a patch added
to the existing system rather than a complete rebuild.
Attempts to deal with the increasing number of
reported cyber crime incidents include more
legislation, user training, public awareness, and other
technical security measures.12
However, the internet will remain imperfect, and
things will go wrong. Indeed, the futile search for
perfect security may ultimately do more harm than
good, by creating a misplaced sense of security in
technology that might increase the use to take greater
risks. This in turn raises two related questions from a
legal perspective:
1. Who should be given the role of minimizing the
harm, together with the rights and authority that
comes with such a role.
2. Who can be held legally liable if harm occurs.
These two questions are connected. In the most
radical answer to question 2, software producers
could also be held liable for the harm done to one of
their customers when flaws in the software enable a
hacker to steal sensitive data.13 Rather, they would
also be held liable if the computer subsequently
6 The Government reply to the fifth report from the
House of Lords Science and Technology
committee, (Cm7234, 2007, The Stationery Office
Limited); Securing Britain in an Age of
Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security
Review, (Cm7948, 2010, The Stationery Office
Limited).
7 The Cost of Cyber Crime, (Cabinet Office and
Detica, 2011), available at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-
library/cost-of-cyber-crime.
8 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
National Security Strategy, (Cm7953, 2010, The
Stationery Office Limited) p. 27
9 Personal Internet Security, Volume 1 Report (HL
Paper 165–I, 2007, The Stationery Office Limited).
10 Paul Hunton, ‘The growing phenomenon of crime
and the internet: A cybercrime execution and
analysis model’, (2009) Computer Law &
Security Review, 25(6), 528-535.
11 US-CCU Special Report, Overview by the US-CCU
of the Cyber Campaign against Georgia in August
of 2008, (US Cyber Consequences Unit, August
2009), available at http://www.registan.net/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-
Campaign-Overview.pdf.
12 Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
safety, security and resilience in cyber space,
(Cm7642, 2009, The Stationery Office Limited).
13 Existing liability regimes for faulty software have
largely failed to provide an incentive to software
producers to make safety an overriding concern.
While in theory, contractual liability for negligent
design flaws does exist, it rarely results in
successful actions.
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14 Andrew J. McClurg, ‘Armed and Dangerous: Tort
Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms’,
32 (2000), Connecticut Law Review, pp 1189-1125.
15 Personal Internet Security, Volume 1 Report (HL
Paper 165–I, 2007, The Stationery Office Limited).
16 Lillian Edwards, ‘Dawn of the Death of
Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill
Zombies’, (2006) Cardozo Arts & Entertainment
Law Journal, 24:23, pp. 23-62.
17 Personal Internet Security, Volume 1 Report (HL
Paper 165–I, 2007, The Stationery Office Limited)
at 3.30.
18 Personal Internet Security, Volume 1 Report (HL
Paper 165–I, 2007, The Stationery Office Limited)
at 3.20.
19 It is at this point important to note that in our
analysis, TC is more than just a sophisticated tool
to protect individual computers, an “anti-virus
system +”. It does not just protect a computer, it
also communicated with other machines that this
computer is safe and protected – and will permit
communication only between systems that signal
their “trustworthiness” in this way. It therefore
has the capacity not only to create more secure
machines; it is capable of creating a more secure
network of trust. As mentioned above, it is this
horizontal, third party effect that creates unique
legal questions.
20 Brian Berger, ‘Trusted computing group history’,
Information Security Technical Report, (2005),
10:2, pp 59-62. 
becomes part of a botnet and harms third parties,
outside the contractual nexus. This, obviously, would
be a strong incentive for software developers to invest
in program safety. However, if there were such a
radical change of the liability regime, it would be
necessary to give them the rights and privileges
necessary to enforce, if necessary, the new safety
features that they have developed, if necessary
against their own customers. Similarly, owners of
computers could also be held liable for third party
harm if their computer was used in a botnet attack. In
both cases, the treatment of computers would be
analogous to the way in which some jurisdictions
treat ownership of guns – legal to own, but where a
third party comes to harm, the owner faces liability if
they are negligent.14
As mentioned above, the House of Lords’ report15
identified three possible answers: to rely on laws and
policing by the state, with a general responsibility
similar to that as exists for other critical
infrastructure; to provide incentives by requiring users
to protect themselves, or to treat it as a technological
problem that is left best to software professionals in
the ‘enabling’ industries, from PC manufacturers to
ISPs. Edwards16 offers a helpful analysis of these
different regulatory strategies.
The first option is funded by the taxpayer for the
benefit of a very specific segment of the economy, in
effect a hidden subsidy for bad software design –
analogous to asking the government to use tax to
constructing even safer roads so that vehicle
manufacturers can spend less on designing safer
braking systems. In addition, governments only act
within national borders, which seriously limits their
efficiency in addressing what is a global problem.
Making users responsible for their own safety was
traditionally, as the report notes, the preferred option
by government and business alike – but as security
experts have noted, this is an entirely unrealistic
notion: the average user does not have the
technological sophistication to protect himself, and,
as one response to the report stated, “consumers
were not required to purify or boil water, when the
source of contamination was within the water supply
infrastructure itself. Instead suppliers were required
to maintain a secure network, and treated water up to
exacting standards. The end-user simply had to
switch on the tap to get pure, drinkable water”.17
Finally, there is the option of holding the private
sector and the software industry responsible for the
safety of the internet.18
For several reasons, the strategy of holding the
private sector and the software industry responsible
for the safety of the internet has much to recommend
itself to policy makers. Internet service providers,
hardware developers and software vendors enjoy the
commercial benefits from the internet, and their know
how and expertise means they are best placed to
protect the user against the most common dangers.
Furthermore, many of these companies already
operate globally, avoiding some of the limitations that
governments would inevitably face, and also avoiding
the need for an international treaty that take along
time to negotiate. Putting the industry at the centre of
the effort to create a secure internet is indeed one of
the recommendations of the report, if necessarily
backed by legal sanctions. Releasing inherently
vulnerable software and hardware to consumers, in
this view, should carry the same liability that a water
vendor would incur for the safety of the manufacture
of the glass bottles used in storing the water.
This course of action would, naturally, create a
significant risk to technology companies, exposing
them to potentially costly litigation. Arguably, a much
better strategy for the industry is to pre-empt any
additional legislation by improving security
voluntarily. The TC initiative can be seen as a first
response to this, with software companies and
hardware developers taking on the responsibility for
(aspects of ) the internet infrastructure.19
Trusted Computing Group – aims and objectives 
TCG was formed as a result of concerns for the
exposure of data on systems, system compromise
because of software attack and lack of methods to
prevent misappropriation of theft.20 The term ‘trust’
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has many different interpretations. The relevant
concept here arises from the field of trusted systems,
in accordance with RFC 2828.21 Thus, Trusted Systems
are asserted to be systems that can be relied upon to
perform certain security policies in an expected way,
with behavioural consistency: TC “refers to a
computer system for which an entity has some level
of assurance that (part or all of ) the computer system
is behaving as expected”.22 The outcome ultimately
would be to allow the user to ‘blindly trust’ his
computer again, without a constant need for the user
to monitor the computer itself. The purpose of TCG
project is to provide assurance to the computer user
to trust his own computer and for ‘others’ to trust that
specific computer.23
Thus the aim of the TC is to protect the software and
data in computer platforms (servers, desktops,
laptops, PDAs, mobile telephones and many more)24
from external attacks and physical theft, with the
added intention of improving security for remote
access. It aims to “enable entities with which the
computer interacts to have some level of trust in what
the system is doing”.25 This protection is provided by
implementing isolated execution environments. In
such environments, total isolation of software and
data is preserved to ensure protection from possible
interference either from other software processes (in
the sense that no memory or resource sharing will be
taking place) or from connected devices (in the sense
that no device will obtain access to the CPU), while
processing. When a user fills in data through their
web browser, none of the other programs on the
computer need to ‘see’ what the user is doing. By
isolating the programs this way, the user might lose
some functionality, for instance not to be able to use
the Word spellchecker in programs other than Word,
but malicious programs cannot intercept and record
what the user is doing. Trusted platforms purport to
provide such environments by providing a collection
of isolated environments for operating systems,
applications and applets in which to operate on data;
and defines which applications will be permitted to
operate on selected data.26 For instance, a user can
decide to protect his private data (financial
information, personal data) by choosing which
applications that his platform will be permitted to
obtain access and operate on his private data – and
no other program will be given access to this
information. Additionally, trusted platforms can offer
assurances about their behaviour and identity both in
hardware and software.27
Technical analysis of Trusted Computing
technology 
How the Trusted Platform works 
Trusted platforms (TP) provide a technological
implementation and interpretation of the factors that
must be simultaneously true in order to achieve
“trust” and are defined by the TCG:28
1. Unambiguous identity: In order for something to be
able to be trusted, it must be unambiguously
identifiable, thus every component of a TP must be
known and identifiable.
2. Unhindered operations: Something can be trusted
if it behaves in an expected manner for a particular
purpose. A component of a TP has been designed
to perform a particular task and follow a designed
behaviour.
3. Attestation: The process of reliably verifying and
guarantying that something is to be trusted, by
observing its constant good behaviour. In analogy,
for a TP to be trustworthy there needs to be some
21 Boris Balacheff, Liqun Chen, Siani Pearson,
Graeme Proudler and David Chan, ‘Computing
Platform Security in Cyberspace’, Information
Security Technical Report, (2000), 5(1), 54-63;
Chris J. Mitchell, ‘What is Trusted Computing?’,
in Trusted Computing, edited by Chris J. Mitchell
(The Institution of Engineering and Technology,
2008), Vol. 6, pp 1-10; Trusted Computing Group
Glossary Retrieved 15/7/2011, 2011, from
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/develope
rs/glossary/; R. Shirey, (2000) RFC2828: Internet
Security Glossary.
22 E. Gallery and C. J. Mitchell, ‘Trusted mobile
platforms’, in Aldini Alessandro and Gorrieri
Roberto, eds, Foundations of security analysis
and design IV (Springer-Verlag, 2007), pp 282-
323; Chris J. Mitchell, ‘What is Trusted
Computing?’, in Trusted Computing edited by
Chris J. Mitchell (The Institution of Engineering
and Technology (IET), London, UK, 2008), Vol. 6,
pp 1-10. 
23 Howard F. Lipson, ‘Tracking and Tracing Cyber-
Attacks: Technical Challenges and Global Policy
Issues’ Special Report, (November 2002,
CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009).
24 G. Proudler, ‘Concepts of trusted computing’, in
C. J. Mitchell, ed, Trusted Computing (The
Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2005),
Vol. 6, pp 11-27.
25 Chris J. Mitchell, ‘What is Trusted Computing?’,
in Chris J. Mitchell, ed, Trusted Computing (The
Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2008),
Vol. 6, pp 1-10.
26 G. Proudler, ‘Concepts of trusted computing’, in
C. J. Mitchell, ed, Trusted Computing (The
Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2005),
Vol. 6, pp 11-27.
27 Eimear Gallery and Chris J. Mitchell, ‘Trusted
Computing: Security and Applications’,
Cryptologia 33:3 (July 2009), pp 217-245; Michiel
Broekman, End-To-End Application Security Using
Trusted Computing (Masters Thesis) (Oxford
University, University of Nijmegen, 15 August
2005).
28 TCG Infrastructure Working Group Architecture
Part II – Integrity Management (v 1.0 17
November 2006 Final) p 9; Eimear Gallery, ‘Who
are the TCG and what are the Trusted Computing
concepts?’, in TRUST2008 (Villach, Austria,
2008).
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way that the platform can report its integrity state
(the platform’s current state) as a whole to the
external world. For that, each component
comprising a TP uses a function to report its state
of integrity.
TPs are designed for the protection and processing of
private or secret data. This means that the occasional
benefits of different applications sharing data are
reduced in favour of greater security. As explained
earlier, this is achieved through isolated execution
environments, where software and data is protected
from external interference, and they can offer
assurances about their behaviour (of both the
hardware and software environment).29
Direct anonymous attestation protocol 
The central part of the hardware is the protocol which
implements Trusted Computing, known as Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA). Consider that we have
a user’s device with a TPM that communicates with
another device called the verifier, who wants to know
(via authentication) if the user uses a TPM.30 However
the user needs to preserve his anonymity and privacy
through this procedure, otherwise the verifier will be
able to know all about the user’s past and future
transactions. To achieve this, the verifier should only
verify that the user uses a genuine TPM, but he
should not be able to know which particular TPM he is
using. From its name, the basic logic of the protocol
can be derived thus: provides proof without a Trusted
Third Party involvement (Direct); non-disclosure of the
identity of the signer (Anonymous); and requirement
of statement or claim from a TPM (Attestation).
The aims of the TCG are achieved by integrating a
trusted hardware module into a platform (a mobile
telephone, a laptop). Although it is not compulsory to
implement a TPM in hardware, it is actually a
requirement, because solutions implemented only by
the use of software have been proved inherently weak
(due to programming faults).31 
TCG solves the privacy problem by making use of a
trusted third party, which in this case is called the
‘Privacy Certification Authority’ (PCA). Every TPM
creates a key pair using the RSA algorithm and this
key pair is called an ‘Endorsement Key’ (EK). The EK is
created only once and PCA keeps a record of the
Endorsement Key of every valid TPM. Whenever a TPM
wants to verify itself to a verifier, it creates another
pair of RSA keys which is called an ‘Attestation
Identity Key’ (AIK) and sends that key pair to the PCA.
The PCA then authenticates this public key that refers
to the EK. The PCA will check if the EK is contained in
its list of valid EKs. If it is contained in the list, the
PCA issues a certificate for the AIK to the TPM. The
TPM can now send the AIK’s certificate to the verifier
and authenticate itself. Although this is a solution for
the trusted computing problem, it has a major
disadvantage: the PCA is involved in every transaction
and thus it must be available at all times and under
all conditions. However, at the same time it must
provide as much security as an ordinary certification
authority which would normally operate off-line.
Moreover, if the PCA and the verifier join together, or
the PCA’s transaction records are revealed to the
verifier by some other means (this can be solved by
using blind signatures), the verifier will still be
capable of uniquely identifying a TPM. Consequently,
the problem with the privacy and anonymity issue
endures.
A better solution was proposed by Ernie Brickell, Jan
Camenisch and Liqun Chen. This solution was
adopted by the TCG in the new specification of the
TPM (1.2) in 2003.  It associates techniques
“developed for group signatures, identity escrow, and
credential systems”, and the scheme proposed can be
described as a group signature scheme, but one
which does not have the opportunity to open
signatures but with a mechanism to detect false
TPMs.33 
Both hardware (the Trusted Platform Module (TPM))
and software (the Trusted Support Services (TSS)),
are combined in a Trusted Computing System. The
software must contain TC-enabled applications. The
role of the hardware by contrast is emphasized in the
‘Fritz’ chip. This smartcard chip – named after Senator
29 Eimear Gallery and Chris J. Mitchell, ‘Trusted
Computing: Security and Applications’,
Cryptologia 33:3 (July 2009), pp 217-245.
30 Ruediger Weis, Stefan Lucks, Andreas Bogk, TCG
1.2 - Fair play with the ‘Fritz’ chip?, 4th
International System Administration and Network
Engineering Conference, Amsterdam, 2004; Ernie
Brickell, Jan Camenisch, and Liqun Chen, ‘The
DAA scheme in context’, in Chris J. Mitchell, ed,
Trusted Computing (The Institution of
Engineering and Technology, 2008), Vol. 6, pp
143-174.
31 Siani Pearson, ‘Trusted Computing Platforms, the
Next Security Solution’, Trusted E-Services
Laboratory HP Laboratories Bristol, HPL-2002-
221, available at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-
2002-221.pdf.
33 Ernie Brickell, Jan Camenisch and Liqun Chen,
‘Direct Anonymous Attestation’, a paper
presented at the Proceedings of the 11th ACM
conference on Computer and communications
security (2004), Washington DC, USA, available at
http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/205.pdf; Ernie Brickell,
Jan Camenisch and Liqun Chen, chapter 5 ‘The
DDA in context’ in C. Mitchell, ed, Trusted
Computing, (IEE, 2005) pp 143-174.
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Fritz Hollings, a US politician with a long history of
legislative attempts to ensure that PCs do not support
production of ‘unauthorized content’ – is placed on
the motherboard which constantly checks the
software and hardware that are running on the
machine. If both are found to be authorized, the
operating system (OS) boots up and assures any third
parties that the machine is indeed the machine that it
is claimed to be, and the software that is running on it
is indeed the software that is claimed to be.
TCG proposed a technology that makes use of four
main features, discussed below. For the technology to
work, it is necessary to install new hardware on
existing computers. The features can work
individually, and they can also work in conjunction
with each other.
Memory curtaining
Memory curtaining refers to a “strong, hardware-
enforced memory isolation feature” in order to avoid
reading and writing memory between several
programs.34 In TC, the operating system should have
access to this type of memory, so if an adversary
enters the operating system it would not be possible
for him to enter and interfere with any program and
its memory. The advantages of using a hardware
feature instead of software – which could operate in a
similar fashion – are: backwards compatibility; the
ability to use code again, and that fewer changes
need to be made to hardware drivers and application
software.35
Secure I/O 
Under secure I/O threats posed by keyloggers and
screen-grabbers are minimized, because it provides a
secure hardware path from the keyboard or mouse
(i.e. the user) to an application and vice versa. No
program can intercept the data from the point where
the user types it in and it appears on the application.
By doing this, none of the software programs will
know what the user typed as a command or input to
another program and how the application responded.
Protection from physical attacks is provided and any
programs that intentionally “corrupt, modify, or
mislead the user, will be prevented from running or
operating”.36
Sealed storage
Until recently, any keys and passwords used by
applications were stored locally on the hard drive.
This was not secure, because keys could be obtained
by any intruder or virus. It is important to ensure that
only legitimate users can obtain access to these
valuable and secret data. This is what sealed storage
purports to achieve. It is characterised as “an
ingenious invention that generates keys based in part
on the identity of the software requesting to use them
and in part on the identity of the computer on which
that software is running”.37
Remote attestation
The aim of remote attestation is to allow
‘unauthorized’ changes to software to be detected. It
remotely traces any changes made to any application
and allows a third party to decide whether the
platform is considered trustworthy. This feature is
significant, because it helps to prevent the sending of
data to or from a compromised or untrustworthy
computer and certifies that no unauthorised program
has been installed, updated or modified in the
hardware or software on the user’s machine.
Moreover, “this allows an entity to authenticate the
software configuration of a platform that is not under
its control”.38
The TCG chip provides three main groups of
functions. These are:
1. Public key functions: used for key pair generation,
public key signature, verification, encryption and
decryption purposes.
2.Trusted boot functions: this ensures that data are
‘trusted’, because the data stored while booting are
the same with the data at the time of sealing.
Trusted booting combines both authentic booting,
which creates a log containing the programs that
are loaded on the computing device, and secure
booting, which ensures that the computing device is
34 Seth Schoen, Trusted Computing: Promise and
Risk, (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2003),
available at
http://www.eff.org/files/20031001_tc.pdf.
35 Mike Burmester and Judie Mulholland, ‘The
advent of trusted computing: implications for
digital forensics’ in Proceedings of the 2006 ACM
symposium on Applied computing (ACM, 2006),
pp 283-287.
36 Mike Burmester and Judie Mulholland, ‘The
advent of trusted computing: implications for
digital forensics’ in Proceedings of the 2006 ACM
symposium on Applied computing (ACM, 2006),
pp 283-287, p 285.
37 Seth Schoen, Trusted Computing: Promise and
Risk, p 4.
38 Jason Reid, Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto, Ed Dawson
and Eiji Okamoto, Privacy and Trusted
Computing, in Proceedings of the 14th
International Workshop on Database and Expert
Systems Applications, (IEEE Computer Society
Washington, 2003), pp 383-388, p 384
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in a secure state.
3.Initialization and management functions: these
allow the user to switch on or off the functionality,
to reset the chip and take ownership.39
TCG provides protection to sensitive authentication
information from attacks by hackers. This is achieved
by protection provided to the user’s private key. In
addition, by sealing the master encryption key under
a TCG register, it is possible to protect a user’s
sensitive files and data.40 
Consequences for the regulatory
environment
From the beginning, TC has been controversial within
the academic and scientific world, the computer
industry, and the end-user community.41 The
proponents of TC suggest that TC promises to provide
four crucial advantages: reliability, security, privacy
and business integrity. These, it is claimed, when
taken together, guarantee a system that will be
available when needed; will resist any attack by
protecting the system and the data; will provide
privacy to the user, and finally it will provide
businesses with the ability to interact efficiently and
safely with their customers. Additionally, TC should
provide protection from viruses, because a check will
be applied to all files trying to ‘enter’ the system, as
well as the implementation of new applications
aiming at providing greater protection.
From the point of view of the software vendors and
content industry, TC aims to provide more
trustworthiness, but paradoxically, from the point of
view of the user, the outcome could be perceived as
less trustworthy, with more power held by
organizations that enjoy little public trust.42 
Critics of TC consider that restrictions will be
imposed on users, because the owner of a PC does
not have root access to cryptographic keys, and
therefore users will no longer be in control their own
computer.43 The validity of this argument is also
confirmed by proponents of TC,44 but they claim that
this is a feature, not an error, as it will restrict issues
such as user override. As noted above, the user has
the ability to disable s0ome of the safety features.
Where such features are rendered inoperative, the
computer becomes open to cyber attack. It is for this
reason that it is suggested it is necessary to
rebalance the degree by which users can override
such features that are put in place by the
manufacturer and still remain trustworthy.45
Consequently, the user will no longer be in full control
of their own computer because they are not permitted
to obtain access to the private keys that purport to
make the user trustworthy, thus it is asserted that the
trust is based on what is promoted as being a ‘well
designed machine’, not badly educated humans.
Richard Stallman, the founder of the Free Software
Foundation and creator of the GNU Project and Free
Software Foundation, is one of the harshest
opponents of TC. Stallman considers that ‘treacherous
computing’ is a more accurate name for TC, and states
that this technology will allow content providers and
computer companies to make computers obey them.
It is possible for users’ data to be edited and deleted
remotely, without any notification to the user or owner
of the computer.46 In the context of this article, this
possibility is central to scenario 4 above:
a)The extent that a TC system provides for the
Trojan defence, when remote access to files by a
third party is a necessary prerequisite for the
system to fulfil its function, and
b)The legal duties, if any, that should be imposed
on TC providers to maintain the integrity of ‘digital
crime scenes’.
39 David Safford, Clarifying Misinformation on TCPA,
(IBM Research, October 2002) available at
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/tcpa_reb
uttal.pdf.
40 David Safford, The Need for TCPA, (IBM Research,
October 2002), available at
http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/tcpa/why_tcp
a.pdf.
41 For an extensive discussion on the controversy
and the reasons behind the controversial nature
of TC see: Catherine Flick, The Controversy over
Trusted Computing (University of Sydney B.Sc.
thesis, June 2004) at
http://liedra.net/misc/Controversy_Over_Trusted_
Computing.pdf
42 Yianna Danidou and Burkhard Schafer, ‘In Law
We Trust? Trusted Computing and Legal
Responsibility for Internet Security’, in Dimitris
Gritzalis and Javier Lopez, eds, Emerging
Challenges for Security, Privacy and Trust
(Springer Boston, 2009), Vol. 297, pp 399-409.
43 Lucky Green, Trusted Computing Platform
Alliance: The Mother(board) of all Big Brothers
(2002), a presentation at DEFKON 10, available at
http://www.cypherpunks.to/TCPA_DEFCON_10.pd
f; Richard Stallman, Can you trust your computer?
2002, available at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-
trust.html.
44 Moti Yung, ‘Trusted Computing Platforms: The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, in Rebecca N.
Writght, ed, Financial Cryptography Lecture Notes
in Computer Science Volume 1/1973 (7th
International Conference, FC 2003, Guadeloupe,
French West Indies, 27-30 January 2003, revised
papers), pp 250-254.
45 Moti Yung, ‘Trusted Computing Platforms: The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, in Rebecca N.
Writght, ed, Financial Cryptography Lecture Notes
in Computer Science Volume 1/1973 (7th
International Conference, FC 2003, Guadeloupe,
French West Indies, 27-30 January 2003, revised
papers), pp 250-254.
46 Richard Stallman, Can you trust your computer?.
TRUSTED COMPUTING AND THE DIGITAL CRIME SCENE
119© Pario Communications Limited, 2011 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 8
Programs that use TC when installed will be able to
continually download new authorization rules through
the internet and impose those rules automatically on
the computer. In such circumstances, it is claimed that
computers may apply the new instructions that have
been downloaded without the user being made aware
of the new instructions, to such a degree that a user
will no longer be able to fully interact with his own
computer.47 This shows that in the context of
computer forensics and crime investigation, the
Digital Rights Management (DRM) heritage of TC
becomes a potential issue. Digital Rights
Management, which was one of the original aim for
developing TC technology, will be used for e-mail,
documents and multimedia which can disappear or
remain unreadable on certain computers, thus
altering programs and files – with obvious
consequences when the evidential value of such files
and programs have to be evaluated.
Legal responsibility in an age of TC 
A significant aim of this paper is to argue that if the
internet is to be made more trustworthy through
technological rather than legal solutions, the provider
of that security will need to obtain access to user’s
hard drives, and have the ability to extract information
and to reconfigure the software on the machine. TC
can be seen as a first step in this direction. In this
analysis, in conceptual terms the TC approach
amounts to a part privatization of what is, in the off-
line world, an essential state function. Safety
becomes a commodity, and its exchange is primarily
governed by contract. Contract, and possibly the law
of tort, has consequently been seen often as the
obvious solution to the regulatory issues that TC
raises.48 However, this perspective leaves the re-
balancing act between the customer or computer user
and the software company to a mix of market forces,
competition law and good faith interpretation of
contractual terms that cannot adequately address the
interest of third parties in the security of the internet,
and in particular fails to address the interest of the
state and law enforcement agencies.
To the extent that scenario 4 is a realistic depiction
of the new realities of investigative work in a trusted
computing environment, several choices become
available. One is to do nothing. In this case, the issue
of access is similar to scenario 3. Since no legal
challenge against the validity of digital evidence on
the basis of an update agent or similar software on a
computer that grants other organization access to it
has been made to date, this could be considered as a
mere theoretical concern. The risk is that should such
a case ever arise, a large number of convictions could
suddenly become unreliable in retrospect.
Alternatively, if our analysis of TC as privatization of a
core state function is considered seriously, it is
necessary to create a legal duty on TC providers to
ensure that any interaction with individual computers
does not affect the integrity of the data for evidential
purposes. Just as the police are required to observe
the requirements of the chain of custody, and to
document the chain appropriately, TC providers could
be required to develop protocols with the explicit
requirement of legal admissibility. This option would
also highlight the potential privacy issues raised by
trusted computing, making the quasi-policing role of
TC more visible. This, arguably, could act as a
deterrence for the uptake of the technology, but this
assumes that consumers will be left with a choice in
the matter.
A related issue is the use of forensic diagnostic
tools. One of the problems with TC that is frequently
raised in the literature is the possibility that it will not
allow certain programs, especially open source
programs, to run on a computer. This could at least
theoretically prevent commonly used forensic tools
such as Encase running on a suspect’s computer.49
Any attempt to deal with this problem generically may
be more difficult than it seems, given the dual nature
of many hacking tools – the very software that a
system administrator uses to ensure safe working of a
computer, or that is needed for a forensic analysis, are
also capable, in the wrong hands, to be used for
malicious purposes – the difference between hacking
and auditing or administration tools lies not in the
code, but the use it is put to. This became visible in
Germany’s much criticized attempt to prohibit the
47 Ross Anderson, Trusted Computing Frequently
Asked Questions/TCG/LaGrande/NGSCB/
Longhorn/Palladium/TCPA – Version 1.1. (2003),
available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-
faq.html; Richard Stallman, Can you trust your
computer?.
48 Yianna Danidou and Burkhard Schafer, ‘In Law
We Trust? Trusted Computing and Legal
Responsibility for Internet Security’, in Dimitris
Gritzalis and Javier Lopez, eds, Emerging
Challenges for Security, Privacy and Trust
(Springer Boston, 2009), Vol. 297, pp 399-409.
49 Stephen Mason, ‘Trusted computing and forensic
investigations’ Digital Investigation Volume 2
Number 2, pp 189 – 192.
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possession of software that can be used for hacking
purposes, and led one journalist to add as a by-line:
‘Will the last security expert to leave Germany turn off
the lights?’50 By the same token, many of the
functions necessary to perform a forensic
investigation on a computer – which by definition
often means to ‘force’ the suspect computer to reveal
its secrets by, for example, breaking passwords or
searching for stenography – will look for all intents
and purposes for the TC system, which is similar to
the very type of process it is designed to prevent from
running.
This in turn leads to another problem: whether it is
desirable in principle that TC provides the purported
‘total’ security from attacks. At first glance this
question might seem absurd, but it is necessary to
understand that the entire field of internet security is
based on a fundamental paradox: what works for the
victim also works for the criminal, and what works for
the criminal can also work for the police. This was
epitomized in the debate around secure encryption in
the late 1990s: while strong encryption protects
honest citizen against data thieves and other
criminals by protecting sensitive communication such
as bank details, it also protects criminals, their
clandestine communications and on-line money
laundering activities.51 Complex compromise
solutions had to be designed, which typically combine
restrictions on some technologies with legal
requirements to hand over keys as part of an
investigation.52 One of the potentially strongest
selling points for TC and proof of its potential to
enhance privacy is that a number of oppressive
regimes prohibit their citizens from downloading the
related TPM technology. However, the technology is
neutral. That TC is considered to be suspicious by
regimes that prefer its citizens to not discuss politics
without the ability of the police to eavesdrop should
also raise concerns for governments worried about
organized on-line crime.
It is also not an option to provide the public with a
‘weak’ form of TC that remains vulnerable to being
penetrated by the police or other state agencies. As
indicated above, organized criminals, often with a
background in the disintegrating security agencies of
the Eastern European block, can match those of
official agencies. More plausible is the idea that the
state will impose a requirement to leave sufficient
weak spots so that when authorized by a court, the TC
provider is in a position to obtain access to the data.
This is very similar to the provision of the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the UK that
creates obligations to reveal the password to
encryption keys. In such an environment, TC providers
face a stark choice: promise a lot, and risk liability
when things fail, or make it clear in the contract that
TC cannot guarantee safety – which would risk to
undermine acceptance and take-up by users. It is
noteworthy to mention at this point that Windows
Vista and Windows 7 are already using the Trusted
Platform Module to facilitate the BitLocker Drive
Encryption. It is undoubtedly the case that users are
not aware of this, but even if they were aware, they
would not be able to understand its features.
Even more directly relevant in considering police
investigations in a TC environment, is that some
investigative methods used by the police use the
same technologies that criminal hackers use to
exploit computer vulnerabilities. In Germany, the
‘Federal Trojan’ was a piece of software that opened
back doors in the computers of crime suspects, to
permit clandestine monitoring of their activities.53
Even more controversially, the recent attack on Iran’s
computer infrastructure for the nuclear industry was
very likely the result of actions by a ‘friendly’ state
power (friendly, that is, to the US and UK as main
sponsors of TC) using a similar, Trojan based
approach.54 A technological solution such as TC that
cannot distinguish in principle between good
governmental Trojans and bad criminal Trojans and
prevents both from functioning, creates potential for
conflicts, both technological and legal, that need to
be further explored. One answer, for instance, could
be to create a further responsibility for the TC
developers, that is, the duty to compromise their own
product under certain circumstances. This in turn
50 John Leyden, ‘Germany enacts anti-hacking law’
The Register, 13 August 2007.
51 David Friedman, ‘A World of Strong Privacy:
Promises and Perils of Encryption’, Social
Philosophy and Policy, 13:2 (1996), 212-228; for
examples of cases that have been prosecuted in
relation to encrypted materials, see Stephen
Mason, general editor, Electronic Evidence, (2nd
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010), 1.34 and
10.228 – 10.250.
52 R. C. Barth and C. N. Smith, ‘International
Regulation of Encryption: technology will drive
policy’, in Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson, eds,
Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and
the Global Information Infrastructure (Cambridge:
MIT, 1997), pp. 283-300.
53 Wiebke Abel and Burkhard Schafer, ‘The German
Constitutional Court on the Right in
Confidentiality and Integrity of Information
Technology Systems – a case report on BVerfG,
NJW 2008, 822’, (2009) 6:1 SCRIPTed 106,
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-
ed/vol6-1/abel.asp.
54 Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu and Eric Chien,
‘W32.Stuxnet Dossier Security Response’
(version 1.4, Symantec Corporation), p 69,
available at http://www.symantec.com/en/
ca/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_resp
onse/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf
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would require a set of legal instruments, on the one
hand to compel them to cooperate, and on the other a
qualified privilege for any harm that might arise from
such cooperation. Decisions also would have to be
taken regarding the procedural requirements to be
used to compel TC providers to cooperate with
criminal investigations, in particular the degree (if
any) of judicial oversight and warrant requirements.
Hence, balancing the legal obligations, privileges,
immunities and burdens in a way that is at the same
time equitable to consumers and software vendors
requires considerably more complex responses by the
law than change to the liability regime that the House
of Lords envisaged.55
A final issue arises from the DRM heritage of TC,
and also how issues traditionally discussed in terms
of privacy protection can take a new dimension in the
context of criminal law and criminal investigations. As
noted above, it seems that the TC providers can obtain
sufficient information from the computers of TC users
not only to prevent unauthorized programs or files
from running (for instance to prevent the playing of an
illegal copy of a music track), but also the possibility
of removing programs. Given such power, it is
possible to infer that the TC provider would at least
have constructive knowledge about the content of the
user’s computer. Increasingly, legal systems create an
obligation to inform the police if they have knowledge
of illegal activity. For instance, the 2001 Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 in the United
Kingdom makes it an offence to fail to disclose
information to the police that would be “of material
assistance in preventing or leading to the arrest of
persons engaged in the commission of an act of
terrorism” (section 117 Information about acts of
terrorism). In Germany, an even broader duties exist
to bring certain crimes to the attention of the
authorities. Article 138 of the Criminal Code (StGB)
mandates that failing to disclose information about a
large number of offences, from terrorism and treason
to murder, kidnap and dangerous interference with
the railway, carries a sentence of up to five years. It is
therefore of some relevance to decide what type of
knowledge is required by these criminal offences, if
fully automated processes that permit the
identification and retrieval of information count as
‘knowledge’ for the purpose of these laws (and if not,
if they should be included), and indeed how much
actual knowledge TC providers could or should have
about the content of their customers’ hard drive. It
could be possible for instance, to look for the hash
value of movie clips known to have content of abusive
images of children, in addition to clips that are merely
illegally downloaded.56
This is not the first time that technological
processes create an unintended side effect in relation
to criminal liability – a case in point was whether
Google was technically in possession of illegal images
when their web crawlers created cached versions of
the web sites they visited, stored on Google servers.
In the case of TC, the problem is not ‘possession’ but
‘knowledge’. Nonetheless, special privileges may
have to be created by law to exempt them from an
overly onerous reporting requirement, especially as
this would make them even more visible as part of a
surveillance operation on behalf of the state and in
potential conflict with their customers.
Conclusions
Internet security has finally gained the interest that it
deserves from the governmental point of view.57
Consumers also need to be confident in internet
security. TC proposes a technical solution, where
security is neither entrusted to the user, nor enforced
by the state, but is found in every unit of the internet.
This paper has outlined that this amounts to a
dramatic shift of power away from consumers and
state regulatory bodies to the software providers, and
such a move will only be acceptable if it is
accompanied by an equivalent shift in legal
responsibility. While the House of Lords58 is right in
its emphasis on the responsibility of software and
hardware producers, it may have underestimated the
amount of adjustments in the legal regime that this
requires. The authors contend that TC is best
understood as the outsourcing of state functions to
the private sector, and with that arises the
requirement to provide, on the one hand, adequate
55 Personal Internet Security, Volume 1 Report (HL
Paper 165–I, 2007, The Stationery Office Limited),
p 121.
56 U.S. v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2008).
57 Emma Downing, Cyber Security – A new national
programme (SN/SC/5832, 19 January 2011) House
of Commons Library; Intellect reacts to the
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review (21 October 2010), available
at http://www.intellectuk.org/media-
releases/6378; Securing Britain in an Age of
Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security
Review, (Cm7948, 2010, The Stationery Office
Limited).
58 Personal Internet Security, Volume 1 Report (HL
Paper 165–I, 2007, The Stationery Office Limited),
p. 121.
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protection for citizens, and on the other, a rational
framework that grants the necessary legal privileges
while imposing certain responsibilities on TC
providers, making them more like the ‘special
constables’ they in fact will become.
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